From the microscopic to the macroscopic level, biological life exhibits directed migration 10 in response to environmental conditions. Chemotaxis enables microbes to sense and 11 move towards nutrient-rich regions or to avoid toxic ones. Socio-economic factors drive 12 human populations from rural to urban areas. However, migration affects the quantity 13 and quality of desirable resources. The effect of collective movement is especially 14 significant when in response to the generation of public goods. Microbial communities 15 can, for instance, alter their environment through the secretion of extracellular 16 substances. Some substances provide antibiotic-resistance, others provide access to 17 nutrients or promote motility. However, in all cases the maintenance of such public 18 goods requires costly cooperation and is consequently susceptible to exploitation. The 19 threat of exploitation becomes even more acute with motile individuals as defectors can 20 avoid the consequences of their cheating. 21 Here, we propose a model to investigate the effects of targeted migration based on 22 the production of ecological public goods and analyze the interplay between social 23 conflicts and migration. In particular, individuals can locate attractive regions by 24 moving towards higher cooperator densities or avoid unattractive regions by moving 25 away from defectors. Both migration patterns not only shape an individual's immediate 26 environment but also affects the population as a whole. For example, defectors hunting 27
cooperators among their interaction partners in randomly assembled interaction groups. 118 In evolutionary game theory payoffs represent fitness and hence determine the rate of 119 change of the population composition as captured by the replicator dynamics 120 ∂ t u = u(1 − u)(P C − P D ), where ∂ t denotes the time derivative [19] . Consequently, 121 cooperation dwindles, ∂ t u < 0, whenever cooperators obtain lower payoffs in the public 122 goods game than defectors, i.e. if P C − P D = −c(1 − r/N ) < 0. Indeed, for r < N 123 defection dominates and ∂ t u < 0 always holds. Conversely, for r > N cooperation 124 spreads in the population, ∂ t u > 0. 125 The replicator equation does not take ecological quantities such as variable 126 population densities into account. In ecological systems, the presence of the public good 127 promotes population growth through improved access to food resources [6] or increased 128 resistance to environmental threats such as antibiotics [7] . The interplay between 129 ecological and evolutionary dynamics in such ecological public goods interactions is 130 captured by
the population density declines. Consequently, interactions occur in smaller groups and 141 returns are split among fewer individuals. For sufficiently small groups, S < r, 142 cooperation becomes favourable again, the population density recovers, S increases and 143 the cycle continues. 144 Even in the absence of spatial dimensions, rich dynamics are observed especially 145 under environmental stress, d > b, where the survival of the population hinges on the 146 availability of the public good [10] . Varying population densities enable the coexistence 147 of cooperators and defectors. More specifically, an interior equilibrium Q undergoes a 148 Hopf-bifurcation [20] when increasing the rate of return of the public good, r, giving rise 149 to stable and unstable limit cycles [11] . For r < r Hopf , Q is unstable, and well-mixed 150 populations are doomed. However, for r > r Hopf , the equilibrium Q allows cooperators 151 and defectors to coexist but the basin of attraction of the equilibrium Q remains limited. 152
More specifically, if cooperators are too rare for the public goods production to offset 153 the death rate d, or if defectors abound, the population may still go extinct.
154
Here we focus on the case were the death rate exceeds the baseline birthrate, d > b, 155 such that only the production of the public good can prevent extinction. This scenario 156
can be interpreted as a microbial population in a biocide where the multiplication factor 157 r reflects the effectivity of the public good to oppose the detrimental effect of the toxic 158 environment. The following extensions explore the effects of different modes of motility 159 on the public goods production and survival of the population.
160

Materials and methods
161
Spatial ecological public goods
162
The spatial dynamics of ecological public good interactions with undirected (diffusive) 163 migration can be formulated as a selection-diffusion process 
with A C , A D , R C , R D ≥ 0 and where terms of the form −K∇ · (φw∇ψ) reflect that 181 individuals of type φ are attracted to the gradient of type ψ proportional to 182 reproductive opportunities, w, at a non-negative rate K (for a detailed microscopic 183 derivation see S1 Appendix). The density of cooperators directly translates into the rate 184 of production of public goods and hence serves as a proxy for its availability and the 185 quality of the environment. For example, the term −A D ∇ · (vw∇u) reflects hunting 186 defectors in search of public goods that are attracted to higher densities of cooperators 187 at a rate A D . Note that the negative sign indicates movement toward higher densities. 188
Similarly, −A C ∇ · (uw∇u) represents aggregating cooperators that are attracted to their 189 kind. In contrast, the density of defectors serves as a proxy to avoid exploitation and cooperators, R C , explore space to avoid exploitation (see Fig. 2B ). In both cases 213 cooperator densities and hence the concentration of the public good are evened out.
214
This suppresses pattern formation and renders the population more prone to extinction 215 through global temporal fluctuations. For r > r Hopf , coexistence of cooperators and 216 defectors in well-mixed populations is stable and the spatial patterns tend to fade away. 217
The only exception is the aggregation of cooperators, which may prevent expansion and 218 hence colonization of empty territory. patterns [13] . The linearized dynamics in the vicinity of Q = (u eq , v eq , w eq ) is given by 229
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The largest eigenvalue (real part) of J I + k 2 J S is a function of k and is called the Effects of directed migration on population densities and frequency of cooperation as compared to unstructured populations. In the absence of directed migration (undirected migration only) homogeneous coexistence results with densities Q = (u eq , v eq ). The two panels depict the ratio of the average spatial population density to the population density in unstructured populations, r p = (ū +v) : (u eq + v eq ) (black solid line), and the ratio of the average cooperator frequency to their frequency in unstructured populations, r c =ū/(ū +v) : u eq /(u eq + v eq ) (green solid line) for (A) cooperator aggregation, A C , and (B) spreading defectors, R D . (A) increasing A C gives rise to four dynamical regimes: (i) homogeneity maintained, (ii) formation of smooth patterns, (iii) discontinuities emerge, and (iv) population expansion prevented. (B) increasing R D only results in two regimes: (i) homogeneity (ii) formation of smooth patterns. In order to facilitate comparisons of regions (i) and (ii) across panels the large effects of discontinuities in (iii) and (iv) refer to the scale on the right of panel (A). In either case, heterogeneous distributions increase (average) population densities and cooperator frequencies. In (A), once discontinuities develop, populations consist exclusively of cooperators. The decrease in r p for large A C relates to the fact that populations are unable to expand and hence the ratio depends on the initial configuration. In contrast, r c remains unaffected because defectors are absent and cooperators are at the maximum frequency. Parameters as in Fig. 3 . discontinuities in the density distribution can develop. Interestingly, this effect turns out 273 to be strong enough to completely suppress defection (c.f. Fig. 3 ). However, increasing 274 gradients require finer discretization to numerically integrate the selection-migration 275 dynamics, Eq. (4), and hence the emerging distributions depend on the discretization. 276 The manifestation of discontinuous distributions becomes increasingly likely for larger 277 values of A C (see S3 Figure) For example, chemotactic bacteria aggregate in patches in response to excreted 317 attractants [22] or try to escape oxidative stress [2] . Instead of explicitly modelling the 318 concentration of public goods and its waste products to assess the quality of the environment, we use the density of cooperators and defectors as proxies for the availability of public goods and the degree of exploitation, respectively. Thus, seeking 321 cooperation and avoiding defection allows individuals to increase their access to public 322 goods and improve their reproductive potential. Interestingly, even though the two 323 migration patterns appear very similar, they may actually trigger movements in 324 opposite directions. For example, cooperators that seek their kind aggregate at the 325 centre of cooperative areas. The resulting increase in public goods also benefits defectors 326
in that same location and may attract more defectors, which increases competition and 327 exploitation. In contrast, cooperators that avoid defectors tend to migrate towards the 328 periphery of cooperative areas and thereby effectively counteract cooperator aggregation. 329
Analogous arguments apply to defectors seeking cooperators or avoiding their kind, 330 respectively, but with opposite effects. More specifically, spreading defectors indirectly 331 support cooperator aggregation by creating (temporary) refuges with low exploitation. 332
As a consequence, directed migration can both enhance as well as inhibit pattern Eq. (7), which provides an analytical threshold for the onset of pattern formation.
341
Regardless of whether spatial heterogeneities arise through directed or undirected 342 migration, they invariably increase both the average frequency of cooperators as well as 343 the average density of populations as compared to unstructured populations, see Fig. 4, 344 and thus improves the odds of population survival.
345
Traditionally the effects of spatial structure in evolutionary games have been 346 investigated based on lattices or more general network structures [23, 24] . Such discrete 347 spatial arrangements are capable of supporting cooperation because they enable 348 cooperators to form clusters and thereby reduce exploitation by defectors. This effect is 349 further enhanced by success-driven migration [25] . In contrast, in our setup space is Keller-Segel chemotaxis model predicts infinite population densities after finite 366 times [26] [27] [28] [29] . Even though a mathematical artifact, those singularities are associated 367 with the inherent feedback between chemotaxis and the secretion of chemical 368 attractants [15] .
369
Nevertheless, the most striking feature of directed migration is the potential of 370 aggregating cooperators to crowd out and eliminate defectors altogether, see Fig. 2A , feedback that gives rise to discontinuous distributions and hence eludes further analysis 373 based on the present framework, Eq. (4). Somewhat surprisingly, the reduced 374 aggregation rate due to a lack of reproductive opportunities, represented by the term 375 w∇u, turns out to be insufficient to maintain smooth numerical solutions.
376
Motility plays an important role in biofilms. Microbes excrete extracellular 377 substances to generate and maintain this protective film. Free-riders benefit from the 378 protection without contributing, which gives rise to the public goods dilemma.
379
Experiments indicate that not only the inherent social conflict plays a vital role in the 380 effective secretion of biofilms [30] but also the microbes motility [31] [32] [33] . Biofilms are no 381 longer generated when deactivating the movement apparatus through deliberate 382 mutations [34] . When specifically targeting the ability to chemotact, biofilm production 383
March 5, 2019 15/21 significantly varies across microbes and experimental setups [31] . This sensitivity of 384 public goods production in response to different types of migration is reflected in our 385 model.
386
The complex interplay between ecological public goods and motility shapes 387 population densities and distributions as well as their social composition. Not only does 388 migration affect the production of the public good but some public goods also alter the 389 motility of their producers. For example biofilms increase viscosity and reduce the 390 motility of microbes or even segregate populations [35] . Conversely, Paenibacillus 391 collectively lubricate hard surfaces to enhance population expansion [36] . Either 392 scenario creates intriguing opportunities for novel feedback mechanisms where migration 393 not only shapes the production and availability of the public good but where the public 394 good represents the very infrastructure needed to stay put or migrate more efficiently. 395 S1 Appendix. Derivation of directed migration terms. 
